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Crop Insurance Premium Subsidies Are  
A Means of Income Redistribution  
To study the role of premium subsidies in crop 
insurance policy design and implementation, the 
research develops a novel framework of analysis 
that effectively captures the empirically relevant 
heterogeneity in producer attitudes towards risk 
(which has been ignored by the relevant litera-
ture), as well as the tradeoffs involved in producer 
decisions with respect to different crop insurance 
options/contracts available to them. The stated 
government objective of premium subsidies to 
increase producer participation in crop insurance 
is evaluated along with their role in inducing the 
desired producer behavior and a separating equi-
librium in the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation, and transferring income from taxpayers 
to agricultural producers/policy participants.  
The analysis reveals a strong connection and a 
complementarity between the stated and revealed 
policy objectives of the government. Premium 
subsidies can, indeed, increase producer partici-
pation in the program, induce a (any) desired 
separating equilibrium with producers with 
different levels of risk aversion choosing different 
levels of risk coverage, and result in welfare trans-
fers to agricultural producers. 
In particular, premium subsidies do increase pro-
ducer participation in crop insurance. Crop in-
surance data from the Risk Management Agency 
(RMA) is consistent with the positive impact of 
premium subsidies on producer participation in 
crop insurance over time. Through the imple-
mentation of several legislative acts expanding 
premium subsidies, the crop insurance program  
The U.S. federal crop insurance is a major farm policy 
aimed at providing risk protection/reduced risk expo-
sure to agricultural producers. A key component of 
this policy is the provision of multiple contract op-
tions and premium subsidies that reduce the cost of 
crop insurance to agricultural producers. Premium 
subsidies have been growing over time and accounted 
for more than $6 billion in government outlays in 
2019, with $2 billion being applied to coverage levels 
of 80% and higher (USDA-RMA, 2020). While the 
government has justified the use of premium subsidies 
as a necessary means of increasing producer participa-
tion in crop insurance, many have argued that premi-
um subsidies are just another means of income redis-
tribution from taxpayers to producers.  
Given the significant producer heterogeneity with re-
spect to attitudes towards risk and the fact that these 
attitudes are private information, an argument can 
also be made that premium subsidies are a means of 
resolving this information asymmetry and inducing 
certain insurance contract choices by producers. In-
deed, the provision of multiple insurance contracts 
reveals the government’s objective of inducing a sepa-
rating equilibrium (where producers select from a 
menu of contracts based on their risk preferences) and 
the premium subsidies represent a necessary means of 
achieving this objective. 
A recent study of ours published in PLoS ONE seeks 
to analyze and evaluate all different policy objectives/
roles of premium subsidies and improve our under-
standing of the relationship between the stated and 
revealed government objectives and the role of premi-
um subsidies in achieving these objectives.  
grew from $254.8 million in premium subsidies for 
99.6 million insured acres in 1994 to $6.36 billion in 
premium subsidies for 769 million insured acres in 
2019.  
The analysis also shows that premium subsidies can 
induce a desirable separating equilibrium in the pres-
ence of asymmetric information by making the partici-
pation of producers with different attitudes towards 
risk in the policies designed for them incentive com-
patible. The change in the structure of premium subsi-
dies by the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection Act 
(ARPA) can be viewed as an attempt to induce a differ-
ent separating equilibrium. In 2000, the year before 
ARPA was enacted, the average per acre subsidy for 
low-coverage insurance (i.e., coverage below 80%) was 
$4.74, while the average subsidy for high-coverage in-
surance (i.e., coverage at or above 80%) was $2.49 per 
acre. In 2001, the first year ARPA took effect, the aver-
age per acre subsidy for low-coverage insurance in-
creased to $8.29 while the average per acre subsidy for 
high-coverage insurance increased to $9.23. The per-
cent of acres in a high-coverage contract increased 
from 5.9% in 2000 to 9.3% in 2001, a 57.6% change.  
Finally, premium subsidies function as means of in-
come redistribution from taxpayers to agricultural pro-
ducers that participate in crop insurance. As noted ear-
lier, premium subsidies have been growing over time 
and accounted for $6.26 billion and $6.36 billion in 
2018 and 2019, respectively. The low-coverage insur-
ance policies received $4.2 billion in 2018 and $4.32 
billion in 2019, while high-coverage policies received 
$2.07 billion in 2018 and $2.04 billion in 2019.  
Given that premium subsidies result in income trans-
fers from taxpayers to producers who participate in 
crop insurance, the question that naturally arises (and 
is at the heart of this research) is whether these trans-
fers are a goal or a necessity for the desired increased 
participation (and a separating equilibrium) to emerge. 
To answer this question, we evaluated whether the gov-
ernment could achieve increased participation at re-
duced costs. It turns out that it can, which makes in-
come redistribution very much a goal of this govern-
ment policy. 
In particular, our analysis shows that the government 
could achieve the (any) desired increase in producer 
participation by providing the premium subsidy asso-
ciated with the low-coverage crop insurance to new 
participants only. Without a subsidy paid to producers  
with low-coverage insurance already in the pro-
gram, there would be no need for a subsidy for ex-
isting producers with high-coverage insurance to 
maintain the desired separating equilibrium (and 
the share/type of producers opting for high-
coverage crop insurance). It is important to note 
that, under this mechanism, the new policy partic-
ipants would receive the premium subsidy for as 
long as the government desired their participation 
in crop insurance. Existing policy participants 
(who keep paying the same premium rate) would 
have no incentive to leave the program as their ex-
pected returns with crop insurance are greater 
than those without. In addition, by participating in 
the program and purchasing a certain coverage 
level, a producer reveals their true type/level of risk 
aversion. If such producers were to leave the pro-
gram one year, they would be able to reenter with 
the terms that were in place when they were par-
ticipating (and would not be eligible for new subsi-
dies designed to induce producers that used to self
-insure to enter the program).  
At this point, it is also important to note that, 
while our analysis focuses on the introduction of 
new premium subsidies, our results are more gen-
eral and apply also to cases where the government 
increases the magnitude of existing subsidies. In 
such a case, under our proposed mechanism, it is 
the increase in the premium subsidy associated 
with the low-coverage insurance that would be 
available only to new policy participants (while 
existing policy participants would keep paying the 
premium associated with their chosen insurance 
coverage policy, which includes the subsidies al-
ready in place). Put in a different way, in cases 
where the government already subsidizes different 
insurance coverage policies, our proposed mecha-
nism would not remove existing subsidies from 
current policy participants but would, instead, 
make the increase in the current premium subsi-
dies available only to new policy participants.  
To assess the magnitude of the savings associated 
with the implementation of our proposed policy 
design, we compare its costs to those of ARPA, 
focusing on the years before and after the imple-
mentation of this reform. We estimate that the al-
ternative policy design could have achieved the 
same acreage enrollment in crop insurance by  
saving taxpayers $780 million, or 95% of the new sub-
sidy payments in 2001 alone. It is important to note 
that additional savings would have been realized also 
in subsequent years as premium subsidies under 
ARPA have continued to exist. 
The fact that the proposed design can achieve the stat-
ed government objective of increased producer par-
ticipation at reduced costs invalidates the argument 
that the income redistribution taking place under the 
current policy design is necessary for increasing pro-
ducer participation in crop insurance. The presence of 
a policy design that can achieve increased producer 
participation and induce any desired separating equi-
librium at reduced costs reveals that the premium 
subsidies in the current policy design are either a 
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